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Introduction
1 This  paper  analyzes  the  development  of  the  biotechnology  industry  in  New  Haven,
Connecticut.  In  1993  there  were  only  five  biotechnology  companies  in  Connecticut.
However, by 2004 the state was home to forty-nine biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies. What led to this increase ? Through extensive field work, this research makes
clear that the most important influence on the development of this cluster was that of
Yale  University1.  Other  contributing  factors  include  the  roles  played by  the  state  of
Connecticut, the city of New Haven, and the local pharmaceutical companies. However,
there is little doubt that the dominant influence was the change in attitude and policies of
Yale  towards  biotechnology-based industrial  growth,  which took place after  1993.  As
such, the case confirms that universities can have an important impact on local industrial
and economic development.
2 The  second  part  of  the  paper  examines  the  region  prior  to  1993.  The  analysis
demonstrates that the region had many of the resources with which industrial clusters
were created in other parts of the world (Piore and Sabel, 1984 ; Porter, 1990 ; Markusen,
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1996).  The  third  part  of  the  paper  examines  how  and  why  the  acceleration  in  the
development of the biotechnology cluster occurred. The last part of the paper describes
the industry as it exists today.
 
I. — The region prior to the transition
I.1. The Region – Connecticut and the New Haven Metropolitan Area
3 Connecticut  is  situated  on  the  northeast  coast  of  the  United  States,  bordering
Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  New  York.  Its  population  is  roughly  3.4  million,
according to the 2000 U.S. Official Census.
 
Figure I - Connecticut County Map.
The study’s region is the New Haven metropolitan area, which includes New Haven and Fairfield
Counties in Connecticut
Source : (State of Connecticut, 2005).
4 New Haven is located about an hour and a half and 80 miles from New York City, and
about two and a half hours and 137 miles from Boston, Massachusetts. There are no direct
flights  to  New  Haven,  and  the  local  airport  provides  only  flights  to  Philadelphia.
According to the 2000 census, the total population of the New Haven metropolitan area,
seen in figure 1, is about 1.7 million, divided between New Haven County (population
824,000) and Fairfield County (882,567). The city of New Haven’s population of 119,491 is
composed of 43.5 % whites, 37.4 % African American, 0.4 % Asians, 3.9 % Native Hawaiian
and other Pacific Islanders, and 0.1 % other races. The New Haven metropolitan area is
home to  seven institutions  of  higher  learning,  which provide  access  to  cutting-edge
research in critical areas such as medicine, information technology, biotechnology, and
architecture. The most notable of New Haven’s institutions is Yale University, the third-
oldest institution of higher learning in America.
5 Despite its location, size, and history, the city has experienced problems similar to much
larger US cities.  The city’s  crime rate in the 1990s was higher than the US national
averages, specifically in the Hills, Science Park, and by the Boulevard neighbourhoods. In
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1994,  New  Haven  was  described  as  « a  war  zone  of  poverty,  crime  and  drugs,  as
frightening as any city in America » (Sedgwick, 1994). The sense of crisis about the city
was growing in the 1980s. For example, thirty-four people were killed in New Haven in
1989, the city’s highest murder rate in recent history. Fuelled by the crack cocaine trade,
rival gangs fought violent turf battles all over the city (Ball, 1999). Safety and security
were particular issues for local high-tech firms when considering to locate in the city
centre. Seemingly small issues, such as street lighting, provision of sidewalks, employee
safety, and parking became important factors in their decisions to remain in the city.
 
I.2. Yale University in the mid 1990’s
6 Yale  University,  one  of  the  world’s  leading  research  universities,  is  known  for  its
excellence  in  many  fields,  including  life  sciences.  However,  its  culture  of  non-
involvement  in  the  community  in  general  and with  industry  in  particular  created a
situation in which it failed to reap the credit for several important discoveries, such as
the transgenic mouse. For many years Yale was not active in technology transfer and by
1993 had spun out only three biotechnology companies. This attitude of non-involvement
in industry changed in the period of 1993-1996. In order to demonstrate this change, this
section examines  the  university  finances,  faculty,  student  enrollment,  and university
policies  with  regards  to  IP  and  technology  transfer,  as  well  as  regional  economic
development before 1993. This analysis proves that while Yale’s resources have hardly
changed over the years, its attitude towards applied research and technology transfer
created the fundamental difference in the local economy.
7 Yale was not a promoter of applicable research or of working with industry. Hence, in
1994, Yale spent $224,939,000 on research and development (R&D) and registered only 16
patents. It is interesting to compare these figures with MIT, which spent $ 374,768,000 on
R&D in that year and registered 99 patents (National Science Foundation, 2003). While
Yale spent $ 14,058, 388 per patent MIT spent $ 3,785,535 per patent. These figures show
that MIT produces more patents per research dollar. Also, until 1993, compared to MIT
that spun out 30 biotech companies at the time, Yale spun out three companies, only one,
Alexion Pharmaceuticals, stayed in the region. These figures are broadly consistent with
the reputation of  Yale  at  that  time as  an institution that  was only peripherally  and
sporadically involved with the local economy and community. As Yale’s president Richard
Levin noted years later :
Outsiders have long regarded the presence of Yale as one of the city’s major assets,
but,  except  for  episodic  engagement,  the  University’s  contributions  to  the
community did not derive from an active, conscious strategy of urban citizenship. It
is  true  that  our  students,  for  more  than  a  century,  have  played  a  highly
constructive  role  as  volunteers.  Even  a  decade  ago,  two  thousand  students
volunteered regularly in schools, community centers, churches, soup kitchens, and
homeless shelters, but these volunteer efforts were neither coordinated nor well
supported institutionally. When I became president, in 1993, there was much to be
done to transform Yale into an active, contributing institutional citizen… In prior
years, however, the university had taken a relatively passive attitude toward the
commercialization of its science and technology 
(Yale Office of Public Affairs, 2003).
8 With the exception of a few departments such as pharmacology, Yale faculty members
were not encouraged to work on research with practical applications during this period.
It was actually implied that the outcome of such involvement would have an unfavorable
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impact on one’s academic career. As one interviewee who served on Yale faculty during
the late 1960s observed, « One of the things that depressed me was that they did not want
to do any application. You could consult but that was not a good status ».  Important
discoveries were made at Yale during that period, but the Office of Cooperative Research
had a somewhat passive view towards commercialization, and only a few discoveries were
patented2. According to another interviewee :
« There was » very little applied research in Biology, maybe in the medical school
or Pharmacology Chemistry departments. In the Biology department it was looked
down upon. For example we made the first transgenic mouse and the « Office of
Cooperative Research » considered that not to be worthwhile in terms of invention.
Yale was very conservative for many years. Not a very active program. Yale actually
lost a lot of intellectual property because of this culture. They did not patent on
time 
(Interview with Yale faculty).
 
I.3. Local Industry
9 Although only a few biotechnology firms established themselves prior to 1993, this was
not due to an inhospitable environment. In fact, by 1993, Connecticut was host to five
pharmaceutical companies : Pfizer, Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Purdue, Bayer, and Boehringer
Inglheim. Most of these companies had a major presence in the state, including research
facilities ; four of these companies are located in the New Haven Metropolitan Area. In
1995, a total of $ 1.2 billion was spent on pharmaceutical R&D in Connecticut itself (6 % of
the  nation’s  total).  The  companies  operated  research oriented  facilities,  staffed  with
scientists with a deep knowledge base in biomedicine, but interactions with researchers
at Yale and other local universities were limited. None of these companies established
institutional relationships with local research institutes, relying instead on opportunistic
specific  interactions  between  their  investigators  and  individual  researchers  at  these
institutes.
 
I.4. State and Industry Relations
10 Until 1996, the state of Connecticut provided no incentives for the development of the
biotechnology  industry3.  Two  biotechnology  companies,  including  Genlogic,  actually
chose to leave the region during this period, complaining of a lack of support (space and
finance).
11 At that time, too, there was no state-wide organization representing the biotechnology
industry specifically, only the Connecticut Technology Council, an industry association
that represents all of the high technology companies in Connecticut. However, in 1990,
responding to public concern over the safety and ethical implications of biotechnology in
general  and  animal  research  in  particular,  the  local  pharmaceutical  companies  in
Connecticut had established a 501c (3) non-profit organization called CURE (Connecticut
United  for  Research  Excellence).  CURE’s  mission  was  to  educate  the  public  on
biotechnology,  specifically on the use of  animals in research.  Initially,  CURE was not
intended to be a lobbying or a representative body for the industry.
12 Thus, examining the region in the period prior to 1993 and up to 1996, we find many of
the resources that could have been the basis of a biotechnology cluster. Previous studies
highlight that the importance of a strong academic base and proximity to universities
From Ivory Tower To Industrial Promotion
Revue d'économie industrielle, 120 | 2009
4
and research institutes is highly important to the biotechnology industry. (Zucker, Darby
et al., 1998 ; Cooke, 2001 ; Coriat, Orsi et al., 2003). Other studies suggest that resources in
the form of  large research laboratory within pharmaceutical  companies,  interactions
with commercial firms, and availability of labor force, which existed in the region, are
also  important  factors  in  cluster  creation,  especially  biotechnology  (Orsenigo,  2001 ;
Breznitz  and Anderson,  2006).  Yet  by  1993  there  were  only  five  local  biotechnology
companies in Connecticut (compared to 129 in Massachusetts at the same point)45.
 
II. — Why and How Did the Transition Occur ?
13 In the early 1990s, when biotechnology firms were growing steadily in the world, New
Haven had missed the information technology (IT) boom and was very keen on seizing
the  biotechnology  opportunity.  This  section  reviews  the  investment  in  economic
development made by different players in the region, which was lead by Yale University…
 
II.1. Choices and Changes – the Role of Yale University
14 By 1993 the university, which was a leading institution in life-sciences, was concerned
that  the  lack  of  industry  and  industry  collaborations  will  harm  the  ability  of  the
university  to  attract  and  retain  star  scientists  and  bright  students,  thus,  damage
university research and reputation.
What was happening was the university was starting to become concerned that it
would  detract  from  our  ability  to  compete,  to  attract  the  best  and  brightest
students, the best and brightest faculty, et cetera, if we didn’t do something about
it… First and foremost it was all about enhancing our reputation as a university,
and two things come from that. One is our ability to attract and retain the best and
the  brightest  faculty  and  students,  and  the  second  is  to  diversify  the  regional
economy.  Those  were  probably  the  principal  reasons,  and  we  weren’t  against
making  money,  but  we  weren’t  making  a  lot  at  the  time.  It  really  wasn’t  the
principal motivator, it really was about our reputation 
(Interview with Yale Director).
15 The city’s crime rate made New Haven an unsafe place for Yale’s students (Atlas, 1996).
Yale’s  chose  to  fight  against  local  crime by  working with the  city  of  New Haven to
revitalize the downtown area, and assist its employees to purchase homes in the city6.
Specifically, a $ 2 million project in 1993-1994 put streetlights on nearly every corner of
the Yale campus, an emergency campus phone system was installed, and every entryway
on campus relies on electronic entry. As a university within a city, Yale’s efforts were
viewed as urban regeneration.
16 Richard C. Levin was appointed as the twenty-second president of Yale in 1993. He took
over the university at a time when concerns for recruitment of faculty, students, and the
need to create a secure environment for students were of uppermost importance. This
allowed Levin to implement a vast social, cultural, and economic development change in
Yale. Coming into office in 1993, Levin in his first speech emphasized the importance of
Yale’s contribution to the local economy :
Our  national  capability  in  basic  research  was  built  by  the  far-sighted  policy  of
public  support  for  university-based  science  articulated  during  the  Truman
Administration and pursued consistently, though with varying intensity, ever since.
Today, the scientific capability of American universities is the envy of the world.
We neglect its support at our peril. As we seek to educate leaders and citizens for
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the  world,  as  our  discoveries  spread  enlightenment  and  material  benefits  far
beyond our walls, we must remember that we have important responsibilities here
at home. We contribute much to the cultural life of New Haven, to the health of its
citizens and to the education of its children. But we must do more. Pragmatism
alone compels this conclusion. If we are to continue to recruit students and faculty
of  the highest  quality,  New Haven must  remain an attractive place in which to
study, to live, and to work 
(Levin, 1993).
17 The interviewees that participated in this study overwhelmingly agreed that the catalyst
of the change in Yale’s attitude toward research with potential practical applications was
the arrival of Richard C. Levin in 1993. Levin, an economics professor, had a vision for
Yale.  He  wanted  Yale  to  be  a  « contributing  institutional  citizen »  with  a  long-term
commitment to the community (Levin, 2003).  By referring to Yale as a « contributing
citizen » Levin was referring to a broad range of activities at the university and not solely
its role as an enhancer of economic development.
18 To pursue this vision, the university conducted an in-depth study of the activities already
performed by Yale in the community and decided to invest  in four areas :  economic
development,  strengthening  neighborhoods,  revitalizing  the  downtown  area,  and
improving the city image.
19 In  order  to  support  the focus  on economic  development,  Yale  rebuilt  its  technology
transfer  office,  the  office  of  Cooperative  Research  (OCR).  The  original  Office  of
Cooperative Research was established in 1982,  and dealt primarily with licensing and
tracking patents. There was no real attempt to create or promote technology transfer
from the academic to the industrial arenas, although a notable success before the rebuild
was the compound licensed to Bristol-Myers-Squibb that became the highly successful
drug Zerit® (Stavudine). Initially this license produced little or no income to Yale, but by
1998 it was generating royalty income of 30-40 million dollars annually.
20 In 1995, President Levin and Yale’s provost at the time, Allison Richard, who in 2003
became the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, persuaded Gregory Gardiner,
a  former  Pfizer  executive,  to  head  the  restructured  Office  of  Cooperative  Research.
Gardiner, a former member of the Yale chemistry faculty, remembered the earlier lack of
enthusiasm at Yale for research with practical applications, and was eager to help bring
about  change.  Gardiner’s  expanded  mission  changed  the  function  of  the  Office  of
Cooperative Research.
The  duties  of  the  OCR  include  oversight  for  patenting  and  licensing  activities,
university inventions, and contractual relationships between faculty and industry.
OCR staff works with Yale researchers to identify inventions that may ultimately
become commercial products and services useful to the public. OCR staff engages in
industrial partnerships to license Yale inventions. An important goal for the Yale
OCR is to identify new ideas, cultivate venture funding for them, and facilitate their
development into companies that become part of the New Haven economy 
(Office of Cooperative Research Website, 2003).
21 Thus,  the  new  Office  of  Cooperative  Research  would  actively  promote  technology
transfer,  new  firm  formation  spinning  out  from  the  university,  and  local  economic
development.
22 There were many obstacles facing Gardiner and his team. One of the biggest challenges
was to communicate the new priorities and incentive structure to the Yale faculty.
I  was asked many times by junior faculty,  « if  I  get involved with new ventures
through the OCR, will I still get tenure ? » I told the committee [Educational Policy
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Committee of the Yale Corporation (the Yale trustees)] that we have to get Yale
faculty to understand it is OK. At MIT, history says that this is OK but at Yale we
need a change of culture (Greg Gardiner, Former Director of the OCR).
23 This quote highlights the difference between policy creation and policy diffusion. While
Yale  changed  its  policy  its  affects  would  not  take  place  until  the  change  become
widespread. In order to achieve this goal of institutional cultural change, the OCR had
discussions with departmental chairs and faculty to explain the institutional change and
Yale’s commitment to individual involvement in economic development. The Office of
Cooperative  Research  representatives  approached  faculty  who  worked  on  applied
research and had made important discoveries in the past. One of these faculty members
recalls :
The  OCR  people  came  to  professors  who  had  records  in  licensing  or  industry
interaction and asked for ideas to patent and establish companies. They came to my
lab, they knew I worked in XXX and XXX. One of the compounds went to « company
name ». They also recruited the management for the company.
24 An  examination  of  the  disclosure  process,  the  process  by  which  a  faculty  member
discloses his  invention to the university,  found that there was a need to change the
process  so  as  to  prioritize  the  inventions  that  were  most  likely  to  succeed.  The
examination resulted in a major policy shift where OCR would seek out new inventions
early, examine them quickly, and invest time and effort only in the strongest candidates.
In  addition,  the  upgrading  of  Office  of  Cooperative  Research  practices  led  to  the
identification and recovery  of  more  than $  220,000  of  unpaid  royalties  from several
licenses. Also, recognizing that 80 % of patents from Yale were in the biomedical field, the
OCR opened another office in the School of Medicine with four staff members (Office of
Cooperative Research, 1998).
25 The Office of Cooperative Research’s activities were characterized by active promotion of
commercialization  of  research  on  a  local  level,  not  merely  passive  acceptance.  For
example,  during  1996-1997,  the  OCR established direct  contacts  with  venture  capital
firms, since lack of funding was an issue for many of the university spinouts. Their goal
was not only to persuade venture capital firms of the relevance of university technology
but also to convince them of the importance of creating new ventures in New Haven.
Their hard work of seeking appropriate investors eventually paid off and in 1998, after
two years of efforts, the first round of financing was concluded with $ 20 million for five
companies.
We have all kinds of venture capital. One of the dirty little secrets is that although
Boston thinks of itself as a major financial capital, we’ve got one that’s even bigger.
It’s called Stamford Greenwich. When there was no state income tax, all the bankers
used to live in Stamford Greenwich, not in New York City. So they all are still there,
and  that’s  where  they  have  their  finance  companies7 (Interview  with  Yale
Administrator).
26 An  equally  important  problem  was  the  lack  of  appropriate  infrastructure,  such  as
laboratory space for new business ventures,  as well as urban amenities to make New
Haven  attractive  to  mobile  scientists  and  academics.  In  order  to  assist  in  the
development,  President  Levin  used  Yale’s  ability  to  recruit  top  talent  and  in  1998
convinced Bruce Alexander, a prominent figure in urban regeneration to join Yale’s office
of New Haven and State affairs8. As explained by a Yale official :
And  it  became  clear  that  there’s  no  better  person  to  kick  out  the  economic
development kind of mission that Yale would like to have than a guy like Bruce, so
Rick « president Levin » convinced Bruce to take it on full time. It’s one of those
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things where you sit around going, « it’s nice that everyone wants to do this », but
how many people are going to be able to tap a guy like Bruce Alexander to be their
economic  development  guru ?  The  guy  who  redeveloped  the  Harbor  place  in
Baltimore, the guy who did South Street Seaport in Manhattan. It makes us all look
smart, but it’s what a university like Yale can do.
27 The OCR, with the office of New Haven and State Affairs at Yale, led by Bruce Alexander,
set out to build laboratory space close to Yale’s scientists. Accordingly, the university
attracted two developers, Winstanley Associates and Lyme Properties, LLC, both of which
had  experience  in  building  labs.  Winstanley  bought  the  vacant  headquarters  of  the
telephone  company  on  George  Street,  and  Lyme  took  over  the  development  and
management of Science Park on north campus (where the university and the city had
been trying unsuccessfully for years to build a science park).  At  the same time Yale
invested in its properties in the downtown as part of making the rundown New Haven a
safer and more enjoyable city. For example, in its Broadway street properties Yale created
a mix of both local businesses and national chains – transforming the area into a vibrant
shopping area and late-night gathering spot.
28 As  a  result  of  Yale’s  efforts  to  change  its  attitude  to  technology  transfer,
commercialization, and economic development, Yale created physical as well as cultural
changes. While Yale did not set cultural change toward economic development as a direct
goal,  it  became unavoidable.  While the university invested in its  technology transfer
office and officers, in rebuilding the downtown area, and assisting in the development of
laboratory  space,  and  connections  to  industry,  it  demonstrated  to  faculty  that  the
university  is  determined  to  support  applied  research  and  commercialization.  This
attitude change, as well as the arrival of faculty from universities that already had a
tradition  of  working  with  applied  research  and  commercialization  influenced  some
hesitant faculties to venture into commercialization or even entrepreneurship.
29 Today  the  Office  of  Cooperative  Research  sees  itself  as  a  catalyst  of  local  economic
development, but hopes that in the future its involvement will not be as important. The
missions  of  the  OCR  today  are  to  benefit  the  community  by  transferring  academic
inventions to the public, to enhance the reputation of Yale University and its faculty, and
to contribute to local economic development, while in the past the office focused solely
on patenting and licensing. It took six years (1993-1998) to implement the changes at Yale
and at the Office of  Cooperative Research specifically.  In August 1999,  Greg Gardiner
retired and Jonathan Soderstrom was appointed his successor as director of the OCR. As a
result  of  the  efforts  by  Yale  in  general  and  the  OCR  in  particular,  twenty-one
biotechnology companies have been established in the New Haven Metropolitan Area,
and many more are in development, as described in Table 1.
30 Table 1 summarized the Office of Cooperative Research accomplishments from 1996 till
2000. During this time licensing revenues grow from $ 5,007,485 in 1996 to $ 46,121,239 in
2000, a growth of 821 %. New licenses grow from 28 in 1996 to 47 in 2000, a growth of 68
%. Number of patents issued grew from 13 to 143, a growth of 197 %. Today, Yale has
sixty-one spinouts in total and thirty-nine biotechnology spinouts. It is important to note
that the OCR does not only build local companies. From the 70 licensing agreements put
in place by the OCR in 2003, only 10 were with local companies, the rest were licensed out
of state and on an international level. However, while the OCR promotes the transfer of
Yale’s  technology  to  industry  in  general,  not  only  on  a  local  level,  Yale  is  strongly
committed to the local economy.
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Table 1 - OCR Activities 1996-2000 9
Source : Ofﬁce of Cooperative Research, 1999-2000 10.
 
II.2. The role of the state, the city, and industry
31 Until 1996, the state of Connecticut provided no incentives for the development of the
biotechnology industry11. However, in 1998, based on the work of 125 business leaders
from Connecticut, six industries were identified as key sectors for Connecticut’s economic
development,  including  biotechnology.  Basing  its  efforts  on  Michael  Porter’s  cluster
methodology, the state launched an industry cluster initiative under the Department of
Economic and Community Development. The first attempt to launch a cluster was the
bioscience cluster.
32 There are two entities representing the state of Connecticut in this effort. The first is
Connecticut Innovation (CI). Created by the legislature in 1989, Connecticut Innovation was
charged with investing in local companies in order to enhance economic development. CI
was originally funded by the state. But since 1995, CI has financed its equity investments
solely through its own investment returns, not through taxpayer dollars. It became the
state’s leading investor in high technology. The mission of the organization is « Making
equity investments in emerging Connecticut technology companies ; providing essential,
non-financial support to entrepreneurs ; and conducting initiatives that address specific
needs of Connecticut’s technology sector » (Connecticut Innovations 2003). CI has several
ways of investing. Although generally it is an active investor, participating in creating a
company,  writing the business  plan,  and helping to select  the management team,  CI
sometimes joins in the bridge round or Series A of the financing process12. Carolyn R.
Kahn, PhD, a bioscientist by training, was appointed to lead CI’s investments in bioscience
in 1998 13. Two major sources of funds are available to the local biotechnology industry :
• TheConnecticut BioSeed Fund. Similarly to German government investments in biotechnology,
BioRegio program (Adelberger, 1999), this $ 5 million fund, administered by CI, provides
seed capital to address the initial financial needs of young Connecticut companies,
sustaining them until they are able to attract a lead institutional biotech investor for a
Series A round of financing.
• The Bioscience Facilities Fund. This $ 60 million fund is used to underwrite the development of
incubator and lab space. The state legislature created the fund in 1998, with $ 30 million of
state monies, and charged CI with its management. CI contributed an additional $ 10 million,
using proceeds from its equity investments. Since then, the fund has committed more than $
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20 million to finance more than 225,000 square feet of laboratory and related space
(Connecticut Innovations 2003). This particular fund was unique… In the late 1990s most of
the national and private investment in biotechnology did not provide funding for laboratory
space. In many cases companies could enter incubators owned by local or national
governments, but direct funding to build a laboratory was not available.
33 The second state initiative to promote the Bioscience Cluster is the Office of Bioscience.
With the  second cluster  bill  in  2001,  the  state  of  Connecticut  allocated $  100,000  to
establish the Office of Bioscience within the Department of Economic and Community
Development. The office has three employees, one of which is also working part time at
the industry association, CURE (see below). The Office of Bioscience was built to support
start-up and existing companies in the region, to provide all the necessary information
on conducting business in Connecticut, to bring new and existing out-of-state companies
to the region, and to represent the life science cluster of Connecticut in national and
international events (interview with one of the office’s executives).
34 Similar to Massachusetts, California, and North Carolina, Connecticut also provides tax
incentives for the biotechnology industry (Mass Biotechnology Council (MBC) and Boston
Consulting  Group  (BCG),  2002).  These  include  the  1996  Biotechnology  Tax  Incentive
Package that provides exemptions from sales, use and property taxes, and a fifteen-year
carry forward R&D tax credit ; the 1999 Tax Credit Exchange in which eligible companies
that cannot use their research and development tax credits can exchange them with the
state for 65 % of their value ; and the Sales Tax Relief -50 % and 100 % exemptions are
available on certain biotechnology industry materials, such as tools, fuels, equipment,
and safety apparel.
35 Besides the state initiatives, the industry created institutions to promote biotechnology.
The main example is Connecticut United for Research Excellence (CURE), the industry
association.  CURE’s  main  activities  are  (a)  lobbying  for  the  interests  of  the  bio-
pharmaceutical industry, specifically seeking to preserve tax incentives for the industry
at a time when the state is running a large budget deficit, and also working to develop a
qualified labour force for the industry by creating certificate programs in local colleges ;
(b)  educating  the  public  in  general,  and  children  in  particular,  on  the  science  of
biotechnology through the BIOBUS program, hoping to stimulate interest in studying and
working in  life  sciences ;  and (c)  acting as  a  conduit  for  information needed by the
industry (how to manage a laboratory, how to build an animal lab, etc.). Under CURE’s
auspices,  local  firms’  top  management,  such  as  their  Chief  Executive  Officers,  Chief
Financial Officers, and Public Affairs and Human Resource executives meet quarterly to
share information on similar problems and solutions.
36 Not all state assistance is directed towards R&D. Perhaps most important are safety and
infrastructure concerns. The City of New Haven contributed to the development of the
biotechnology industry by providing it with basic infrastructure and addressing safety
concerns, such as streetlights and building sidewalks, especially in the area adjacent to
Science Park on 300 George Street, located in one of the neighbourhoods with the highest
crime rates in the city.
The city administration is doing more than I expected. They support business. This
area  here  was  not  a  very  good  part  of  town,  they  renovated  the  area,  put
streetlights.  We did  not  have  a  single  incident  of  assault.  The  city  government
should  take  credit  for  that.  The police  force  is  very  responsive  (Interview with
biotechnology executive).
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37 In summary, although Connecticut and the city of New Haven’s support for university-
industry relationships in general and for the biotechnology industry in particular started
only in the late 1990s, the region has a wide net of support for economic development.
This  support  by  the  federal  and  state  government  and  industry  is  evident  in  tax
incentives, new venture funding, lobbying groups, and policy-related logistical assistance.
Much of this support is similar to national and regional efforts in Europe and other US
states (Adelberger, 1999 ; Mass Biotechnology Cluster (MBC) and Boston Consulting Group
(BCG), 2002 ; Breznitz and Anderson, 2006).
 
III. — The Impact of Yale’s Economic Development
Initiative
38 Today, the New Haven biotechnology cluster has forty-nine companies, including twenty-
four companies, or 49 %, which were created with technology, ideas, or founders from
Yale and with the help of the OCR. A total of twenty Yale spinouts were established in
New Haven after 1993, the same year Yale started to implement its changes. The majority
of the biotechnology companies in this area work in the human therapeutic sector (See
figure 2). This could be directly related to Yale’s strength in life sciences and to the fact
that 49 % of the New Haven cluster is based on Yale University spinouts. This includes
companies working in more than one sector. The results, below, are based on the self-
definition  of  fifteen  companies  interviewed  within  the  cluster.  The  cluster  employs
directly 16,686 people. Most of the firms are small- to medium-sized, with less than 50
employees.
 
Figure 2 - The biotechnology cluster in the New Haven metropolitan area by sector
Source : Author.
39 Yale’s change toward technology transfer and commercialisation made an impact on the
state of Connecticut as a whole. As noted in table 2, Connecticut R&D expenditures in
bioscience are constantly growing,  where the majority of  growth can be seen in the
biotechnology companies. This has a direct correlation with the growth in total number
of biotechnology companies14. In 2003, expenditures by the pharmaceutical industry in
Connecticut, which dominates the expenses of R&D in the state, accounted for more than
12 % of  all  R&D dollars  spent  by  pharmaceutical  companies  nationwide  (Connecticut
United  for  Research  Excellence  (CURE),  2003).  This  represents  extensive  growth
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compared to the 6 % spent by pharmaceutical companies in Connecticut in 1995, when
there were only six biotechnology companies in the region.
 
Table 2 - The bioscience cluster by R&D expenses in Connecticut
Source : Cure, 2003.
 
III.1. The Impact on the Local Pharmaceutical Companies
40 The strength of the local biotech industry has changed the way existing pharmaceutical
firms interact with other players in the region. The local pharmaceutical companies have
significantly changed their behaviour and funding patterns, and give more weight to the
local intellectual base.  There are constant connections between local pharmaceuticals
and the local universities and research institutes, cultivated by Yale’s OCR, CURE, and the
Office of  Bioscience.  These connections include,  but  are not  limited to,  Yale and the
University of Connecticut. Pfizer, for example, chose to utilize the local knowledge base
by developing a direct relationship with Yale. Pfizer invested $ 35 million in a 60,000
square-foot clinical trial facility in downtown New Haven between Park and Howe Streets,
on  land  which  is  owned  by  the  state  of  Connecticut.  Additionally,  Bayer  initiated  a
scholar’s program in 2003, which appoints a faculty member each year as a fellow and
works closely with Bayer.
41 Today one can also find business relationships between local pharmaceuticals firms and
the local biotechnology industry. Neurogen Corporation, a biotechnology company, and
Pfizer began a two-year research partnership in 1998 to work on GABA neurotransmitter
receptor-based  drug  programs  for  the  treatment  of  anxiety,  sleep  disorders,  and
cognition  enhancement.  Bayer  and  Curagen  Corporation  collaborate  on  obesity  and
diabetes co-development, pharmacogenomics, and toxicogenomics. R&D expenditures by
the pharmaceutical industry in Connecticut have doubled since 1995, and in 2003 R&D
expenditures accounted for more than 12 % of all R&D dollars spent by pharmaceutical
companies nationwide (Connecticut United for Research Excellence (CURE), 2003) 15.
 
III.2. The Impact on Yale University
42 Examination of spinouts and patenting finds that Yale University spun out thirty-nine
biotechnology companies,  twenty-four locally,  compared with only three in 1993, one
locally. Moreover, in 2003, Yale University registered a total of 28 patents compared with
two in 1993 16. By 2000, 47 new licenses were issued, contributing to a royalty revenue of $
46.12 million (Office of Cooperative Research, 1999-2000).
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III.2.1. The Impact on Yale Students and Faculty
43 Faculty members interviewed at the Yale medical school explained the numerous benefits
in having local biotechnology industry :
Now, for example, we have a company that is occupying some space in the lab… It is
good to have them here, because you have interactions with them and transfer of
expertise (Interview with a faculty member at Yale).
44 Industry-university relationships allow scientific interactions, sponsorship of students,
and access to expensive equipment not available at the university, and expose students to
industrial  practices.  While  working  with  companies  has  benefits  for  students  and
research, it has no bearing on faculty responsibilities, such as teaching, at the university.
A faculty member who spins out a company,  or provides consulting services,  cannot
reduce his or her teaching or administrative load.
No. [Founding a company] didn’t have any effect on my university responsibilities.
In fact the opposite occurred [the university benefited], when getting money from
the company to  go  on retreats,  or  to  buy a  new microscope or  something,  the
company would be able to participate in those activities and use that equipment
(Interview with a faculty member at Yale).
45 Thus, the changes implemented at Yale did not change faculty responsibilities. However,
the changes did contribute to university-industry relationships in the form of research
grants and contracts,  sponsorship of  students,  and access to industry equipment and
experience.
 
III.2.2. Impact on the Office of Cooperative Research
46 Changes in the university also affected the Office of Cooperative Research. Today, the OCR
employs eighteen people, each of whom has five to seven years of industry experience.
The employee background at the Office of Cooperative Research had, and continues to
have, a crucial role in the cooperative relationships between local faculty and industry.
Yes. I do believe that [the people working at the OCR have the skill and knowledge
to  assess  my  technology].  I  don’t  think  there’s  any  question.  And  I  think  that
communication problem has gotten much, much better. From my biased point of
view, I think it’s enormously improved, and that they do a very good job at Yale
(Interview with a faculty member at Yale).
47 Not only does the Office have the staff and expertise, it also is engaged with firm creation
to  an  unprecedented  level.  The  office  is  involved  in  developing  product  scenarios,
financial projections, and business strategies with the scientists. In many cases, the Office
is  actively involved in building the company,  looking for  the right  management and
investors who will succeed in taking Yale’s technology to the market.
48 The level of university-industry involvement within the Office of Cooperative Research is
considered extreme.  Even MIT,  which is  considered the top university  in university-
industry relationships, is not as involved in the creation of companies (Breznitz, O’Shea et
al., 2008).
49 As can be seen in figure four, twenty-four, or 62 % of Yale’s thirty-nine biotechnology
spinout companies chose to locate in the region. This suggests that Yale had a direct
impact on the location choices made by spinouts. The wish to stay close to the university
implies that companies positively view university research and resources.
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Figure 3 - Yale University biotechnology spinouts, 1976-2004
Source : Author.
 
Conclusion
50 This paper describes the development of the biotechnology industry in Connecticut. The
surge of new business formation was a result of efforts lead by Yale University. In 1993
Yale was facing several obstacles : though a strong research university in life-sciences
situated in a  close proximity to many pharmaceutical  companies,  the university  had
almost no industry collaborations or technology commercialization. The university had a
very low rate of patents and licenses compared to the amount of research funding, and by
1993,  compared  to  MIT  that  spun-out  thirty  companies,  Yale  spun-out  only  three.
Moreover, the city of New Haven had become physically unsafe for Yale’s students and
faculty. All of these obstacles were perceived by university administrators as threatening
its capability to draw students and faculty to the university, i.e. threatening its eminence.
Thus,  the university decided to rebuild its technology transfer office,  with an aim to
commercialize Yale’s technology and contribute to local economic growth through the
creation  of  companies  and  collaboration  with  the  local  industry.  Furthermore,  the
university decided to invest in the city itself, i.e., investing in real-estate development of
the university’s old buildings as well as the city’s downtown area, and assisting employees
to purchase houses.
51 Yale was not the only agent of change in New Haven. The state of Connecticut opened a
venture capital firm to invest in IT and life science companies that were willing to build
their  company  in  Connecticut.  Moreover,  unlike  many  other  venture  capital  firms,
Connecticut Innovation was providing funding for facilities and equipment. The city of
New Haven assisted in the logistics of building sidewalks and street lights. The industry
itself  provided a meeting place and networking channel for both pharmaceutical and
biotechnology  companies.  The  total  efforts  of  the  different  players  resulted  in  the
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creation  of  a  biotechnology  cluster,  and  the  building  of  university-industry
collaborations.
52 Comparing the New Haven cluster  development  to  some of  the larger  biotechnology
clusters in the world, we find that the role Yale University played in this cluster is unique.
In many of the biotechnology clusters such as Boston, Cambridge UK, and Silicon Valley,
local universities are important and collaborate with industry (Breznitz and Anderson,
2006). However, thet are viewed as suppliers of technology and labor force. MIT does not
actively seek inventions and is not as much involved in the development of spinouts
(Breznitz, O’Shea et al., 2008). In the UK, both the University of Cambridge and Oxford
University were the basis of the cluster’s technological and humane resource sources.
However, both universities were not actively involved in the creation of the cluster, nor
was  a  national  policy  directed  at  the  development  of  the  cluster17 (Segal  Quince
Wicksteed,  1985 ;  Segal Quince Wicksteed,  2000 ;  Chiesa and Chiaroni,  2005 ;  Solomon,
2005).On the other hand, in other countries in Europe and states in the USA, the
biotechnology  industry  received  similar  regional  level  incentives  to  the  ones  in
Connecticut.
53 In conclusion, this article’s contribution is in the weight it gives the role of the university
in  cluster  development.  Unlike  other  industrial  districts,  the  development  of  the
biotechnology industry in New Haven was lead by Yale University.
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NOTES
1.  This  study  is  based  on  forty-five  in-depth  interviews  with  university  administrators,
academics,  and  senior  management  and  researchers  from  biotechnology  and  local
pharmaceutical companies, local trade association, government representatives, as well as city
and state or national representatives.
2.  One invention that was patented during this period was the profitable drug Zerit® (stavudine).
This drug, which was licensed to Bristol-Myers-Squibb,  is  part of the AIDS drug combination
treatment.
3.  Compare to Massachusetts that recruited a specialist to deal directly with the biotechnology
industry  in  1991  after  the  recommendation  from  Governor  William  Weld’s  Commission  on
Growth and Competitiveness (Breznitz, 2000).
4.  The five biotechnology companies that existed prior to 1993 in the New Haven area were: IBI
(later bought  by  Eastman  Kodak),  Protein  Sciences,  Alexion  Pharmaceuticals,  Neurogen
Corporation, and Curagen Corporation. Only one of these companies, Alexion Pharmaceuticals,
had licensed its technology from Yale University.
5.  The five do not include the two companies that had left previously.
6.  To learn more about the four areas in which Yale made change, see President Levin speech on
page 7.
7.  Stamford and Greenwich are two towns in Fairfield County, Connecticut on the border with
New York. In the 1980s many corporations including financiers moved from New York both to
lower their tax bills and to be closer to the homes of their top executives, who chose to build
their  houses  outside NYC.  Thus,  Connecticut  has a  large concentration of  venture capitalists
living in the New Haven Metropolitan area (which includes New Haven and Fairfield counties).
8.  Yale’s ability to recruit top talent is demonstrated in the recruitment of both Greg Gardiner
from Pfizer and Bruce Alexander. This also confirms the notion that Yale had a choice of who to
recruit and when to recruit them.
9.  In total, not just in the New Haven Metropolitan Area, and not just biotechnology.
10.  The  information  provided  in  this  table  reflects  all  fields  of  technology  and  not  just
biotechnology.
11.  While  Connecticut  did  not  provide  any  incentives  for  the  biotechnology  industry,
Massachusetts recruited a specialist to work directly with the biotechnology industry in 1991
after  the  recommendation  from  Governor  William  Weld’s  Commission  on  Growth  and
Competitiveness  Breznitz,  Shiri  M.  (2000).  The  Geography  of  Industrial  Districts:  Why  Does  the
Biotechnology  Industry  in  Massachusetts  Cluster  in  Cambridge? Master’s  Thesis,  University  of
Massachusetts, Lowell. ,  Breznitz, Shiri M. and William Anderson. (2006). Boston Metropolitan
Area Biotechnology Cluster. Canadian Journal of Regional Science. 28(2), 249-264.
12.  A bridge loan is a short-term loan that is used until a person or company can arrange more
comprehensive long-term financing. The need for a bridge loan arises when a company runs out
of cash before it can obtain more capital investment through long-term debt or equity. Series A
preferred stock is the first round of stock offered during the seed or early stage round by a
portfolio company to the venture capitalist. Series A preferred stock is convertible into common
stock in certain cases such as an IPO or the sale of the company. Later rounds of preferred stock
in a private company are called Series B, Series C and so on.
13.  CI invests in many industrial sectors that show potential for Connecticut economy. These
include bioscience, information technology, energy and environmental systems, photonics, and
others.
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14.  As an example, we can see that the number of Yale’s spinouts in the cluster grew by 50 %
from 2000 to 2004.
15.  Compared to 6 % of all R&D expenditures in 1995.
16.  Yale and MIT in the same fields in 2000, Yale had 29 (the same as its total patents) compared
to 58 at MIT (in the specific fields): a difference of 50 %.
17.  National policies in the UK such as the BIO-WISE were created in the late 1990s.
ABSTRACTS
This paper analyzes the development of the biotechnology industry in New Haven, Connecticut.
In 1993 there were only five biotechnology companies in Connecticut. However, by 2004 the state
was home to forty-nine biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. What led to this increase ?
Through extensive field work, this research makes clear that the most important influence on
the  development  of  this  cluster  was  that  of  Yale  University.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the
dominant influence was the change in attitude and policies of Yale towards biotechnology-based
industrial growth, which took place after 1993. As such, the case confirms that universities can
have an important impact on local industrial and economic development. 
Cet article analyse le développement de l’industrie de biotechnologie à New Haven, dans l’État du
Connecticut  aux  États-Unis.  Alors  qu’en  1993,  cet  État  comptait  seulement  cinq  firmes  de
biotechnologies  sur  son  territoire,  en  2004  on  en  dénombrait  49.  Quels  sont  les  facteurs  à
l’origine  de  ce  phénomène?  À  partir  d’une  étude  de  terrain,  cette  recherche  montre  le  rôle
déterminant joué par l’université de Yale dans le développement de ce cluster. Plus précisément,
l’article montre que c’est un changement d’attitude et de politique de l’Université vis-à-vis du
secteur industriel des biotechnologies à partir de 1993 qui explique la croissance de ce secteur
dans la région. L’article conclut sur l’importance du rôle que peuvent être amenées à jouer les
universités dans le développement économique et industriel local.
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